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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a single-agent logic of
goal-directed knowing how extending the standard
epistemic logic of knowing that with a new know-
ing how operator. The semantics of the new op-
erator is based on the idea that knowing how to
achieve φ means that there exists a (uniform) strat-
egy such that the agent knows that it can make sure
φ. We give an intuitive axiomatization of our logic
and prove the soundness, completeness and decid-
ability of the logic. The crucial axioms relating
knowing that and knowing how illustrate our un-
derstanding of knowing how in this setting. This
logic can be used in representing both knowledge-
that and knowledge-how.
1 Introduction
Standard epistemic logic focuses on reasoning about
propositional knowledge expressed by knowing that φ
[Hintikka, 1962]. However, in natural language, various
other knowledge expressions are also frequently used, such
as knowing what, knowing how, knowing why, and so on.
In particular, knowing how receives much attention in
both philosophy and AI. Epistemologists debate about
whether knowledge-how is also propositional knowledge
[Fantl, 2008], e.g., whether knowing how to swim can be
rephrased using knowing that. In AI, it is crucial to let au-
tonomous agents know how to fulfill certain goals in robotics,
game playing, decision making, and multi-agent systems. In
fact, a large body of AI planning can be viewed as find-
ing algorithms to let the autonomous planner know how
to achieve some propositional goals, i.e., to obtain goal-
directed knowledge-how [Gochet, 2013]. Here, both propo-
sitional knowledge and knowledge-how matter, especially
in the planning problems where initial uncertainty and non-
deterministic actions are present. From a logician’s point of
view, it is interesting to see how knowing how interact with
knowing that, and how they differ in their reasoning patterns.
A logic of knowing how also helps us to find a consistency
notion regarding knowledge database with knowing how ex-
pressions.
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Figure 1: A scenario representing how to cure the pain.
Example 1.1. Consider the scenario where a doctor needs a
plan to treat a patient and cure his pain (p), under the uncer-
tainty about some possible allergy (q). If there is no allergy
(¬q) then simply taking some pills can cure the pain, and the
surgery is not an option. On the other hand, in presence of
the allergy, the pills may cure the pain or have no effect at all,
while the surgery can cure the pain for sure. The model from
Figure 1 represents this scenario with an additional action of
testing whether q. The dotted line represents the initial uncer-
tainty about q, and the test on q can eliminate this uncertainty
(there is no dotted line between s3 and s4). According to the
model, to cure the pain (guarantee ¬p) at the end, it makes
sense to take the surgery if the result of the test of whether q
is positive and take the pills otherwise. We can say the doctor
in this case knows how to cure the pain.
How to formalize the knowledge-how of the agent
in such scenarios with uncertainty? Already since
the early days of AI, people have been looking at
it in the setting of logics of knowledge and action
[McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; McCarthy, 1979; Moore, 1985;
Lespe´rance et al., 2000; van der Hoek et al., 2000]. How-
ever, there has been no consensus on how to capture the
logic of “knowing how” formally (cf. the recent surveys
[Gochet, 2013] and [A˚gotnes et al., 2015]). The difficul-
ties are well discussed in [Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007] and
[Herzig, 2015] and simply combining the existing modal-
ities for “knowing that” and “ability” in a logical lan-
guage like ATEL [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003] does
not lead to a genuine notion of “knowing how”, e.g.,
knowing how to achieve p is not equivalent to knowing
that there exists a strategy to make sure p. It does not
work even when we replace the strategy by uniform strat-
egy where the agent has to choose the same action on
indistinguishable states [Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007]. Let
φ(x) express that x is a way to make sure some goal is
achieved, and let K be the standard knowledge-that modal-
ity. There is a crucial distinction between the de dicto read-
ing of knowing how (K∃xφ(x)) and the desired de re read-
ing (∃xKφ(x)) endorsed also by linguists and philosophers
[Stanley and Williamson, 2001]. The latter implies the for-
mer, but not the other way round. For example, consider a
variant of Example 1.1 where no test is available: then the
doctor has de dicto knowledge-how to cure, but not the de re
one. Proposals to capture the de re reading have been dis-
cussed in the literature, such as making the knowledge op-
erator more constructive [Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007], mak-
ing the strategy explicitly specified [Herzig et al., 2013;
Belardinelli, 2014], or inserting K in-between an existential
quantifier and the ability modality in see-to-that-it (STIT)
logic [Broersen and Herzig, 2015].
In [Wang, 2015; Wang, 2016b], a new approach is pro-
posed by introducing a single new modality Kh of (con-
ditional) goal-directed knowing how, instead of breaking
it down into other modalities. This approach is in line
with other de re treatments of non-standard epistemic log-
ics of knowing whether, knowing what and so on (cf.
[Wang, 2016a] for a survey). The semantics of Kh is in-
spired by the idea of conformant planning based on linear
plans [Smith and Weld, 1998; Yu et al., 2016]. It is shown
that Kh is not a normal modality, e.g, knowing how to get
drunk and knowing how to drive does not entail knowing
how to drive when drunk. The work is generalized further
in [Li and Wang, 2017; Li, 2017]. However, in these previ-
ous works, there was no explicit knowing that modality K in
the language and the semantics ofKh is based on linear plans,
which does not capture the broader notion allowing branch-
ing plans or strategies that are essential in the scenarios like
Example 1.1.
In this paper, we extend this line of work largely in the
following aspects:
• Both the knowing how modality Kh and knowing that
modality K are in the language.
• In contrast to the state-independent semantics
[Wang, 2015; Wang, 2016b], we interpret Kh lo-
cally w.r.t. the current uncertainty.
• Instead of linear plans in [Wang, 2015], the semantics of
ourKh operator is based on strategies (branching plans).
The intuitive idea behind our semantics ofKh is that the agent
knows how to achieve φ iff (s)he has an executable uniform
strategy σ such that the agent knows that:
• σ guarantees φ in the end given the uncertainty;
• σ always terminates after finitely many steps.
Note that for an agent to know how to make sure φ, it is not
enough to find a plan which works de facto, but the agent
should know it works in the end. This is a strong require-
ment inspired by planning under uncertainty, where the col-
lection of final possible outcomes after executing the plan is
required to be a subset of the collection of the goal states
[Geffner and Bonet, 2013].
Technically, our contributions are summarized as follows:
• A logical language with both Kh and K operators with
a semantics which fleshes out formally the above intu-
itions about knowing how.
• A complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms.
• Decidability of our logic.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the lan-
guage and semantics of our framework; Section 3 proposes
the axiomatization and proves its soundness; We prove the
completeness of our proof system and show the decidability
of the logic in Section 4 before we concludewith future work.
2 Language and Semantics
Let PROP be a countable set of propositional symbols.
Definition 2.1 (Language). The language is defined by the
following BNF where p ∈ PROP:
φ := p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kφ | Khφ.
We use⊥,∨,→ as usual abbreviations and write Kˆ for ¬K¬.
Definition 2.2 (Models). A model M is a quintuple
〈W,ACT,∼, {
a
−→| a ∈ ACT}, V 〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set,
• ACT is a set of actions,
• ∼ ⊆W ×W is an equivalence relation onW ,
•
a
−→ ⊆W ×W is a binary relation onW , and
• V :W → 2PROP is a valuation.
Note that the labels in ACT do not appear in the language.
The graph in Example 1.1 represents a model with omitted
self-loops of ∼ (dotted lines), and the equivalence classes in-
duced by∼ are {s1, s2}, {s3}, {s4}, {s5}, {s6}. In this paper
we do not require any properties between∼ and
a
−→ to lay out
the most general framework. We will come back to particular
assumptions like perfect recall at the end of the paper. Given
a model and a state s, if there exists t such that s
a
−→ t, we
say that a is executable at s. Also note that the actions can be
non-deterministic. For each s ∈ W , we use [s] to denote the
equivalence class {t ∈ W | s ∼ t}, and use [W ] to denote
the collection of all the equivalence classes on W w.r.t. ∼.
We use [s]
a
−→ [t] to indicate that there are s′ ∈ [s] and t′ ∈ [t]
such that s′
a
−→ t′. If there is t ∈ W such that [s]
a
−→ [t], we
say a is executable at [s].
Definition 2.3 (Strategies). Given a model, a (uniformly ex-
ecutable) strategy is a partial function σ : [W ] → ACT such
that σ([s]) is executable at all s′ ∈ [s]. Particularly, the
empty function is also a strategy, the empty strategy.
Note that the executability is as crucial as uniformity, with-
out which the knowledge-how may be trivialized. We use
dom(σ) to denote the domain of σ. Function σ can be seen as
a binary relation such that ([s], a), ([s], b) ∈ σ implies a = b.
Therefore, if τ is a restriction of σ, i.e. τ ⊆ σ, it follows that
dom(τ) ⊆ dom(σ), and τ([s]) = σ([s]) for all [s] ∈ dom(τ).
Definition 2.4 (Executions). Given a strategy σ w.r.t a model
M, a possible execution of σ is a possibly infinite sequence
of equivalence classes δ = [s0][s1] · · · such that [si]
σ([si])
−−−−→
[si+1] for all 0 ≤ i < |δ|. Particularly, [s] is a possible
execution if [s] 6∈ dom(σ). If the execution is a finite sequence
[s0] · · · [sn], we call [sn] the leaf-node, and [si](0 ≤ i < n)
an inner-node w.r.t. this execution. If it is infinite, then all
[si](i ∈ N) are inner-nodes. A possible execution of σ is
complete if it is infinite or its leaf-node is not in dom(σ).
Given δ = [s0] · · · [sn] and µ = [t0] · · · [tm], we use δ ⊑ µ
to denote that µ extends δ, i.e., n ≤ m and [si] = [ti] for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. If δ ⊑ µ, we define δ ⊔ µ = µ. We use
CELeaf(σ, s) to denote the set of all leaf-nodes of all the σ’s
complete executions (can be many due to non-determinism)
starting from [s], and CEInner(σ, s) to denote the set of all
the inner-nodes of σ’s complete executions starting from [s].
CELeaf(σ, s)∩CEInner(σ, s) = ∅ since if [s] is a leaf-node
of a complete execution then σ is not defined at [s].
Definition 2.5 (Semantics). Given a pointed model
M, s, the satisfaction relation  is defined as follows:
M, s  p ⇐⇒ p ∈ V(s)
M, s  ¬φ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 φ
M, s  φ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  φ andM, s  ψ
M, s  Kφ ⇐⇒ for all s′ : s∼s′ impliesM, s′  φ
M, s  Khφ ⇐⇒ there exists a strategy σ such that
1.[t]⊆JφK for all [t]∈CELeaf(σ, s)
2. all its complete executions
starting from [s] are finite,
where JφK = {s ∈ W | M, s  φ}.
Note that the two conditions for σ in the semantics of Kh
reflect our two intuitions mentioned in the introduction. The
implicit role of K in Kh will become more clear when the
axioms are presented. Going back to Example 1.1, we can
verify that Kh¬p holds on s1 and s2 due to the strategy σ =
{{s1, s2} 7→ test, {s3} 7→ pills, {s4} 7→ surgery}.
Note that CELeaf(σ, s) = {[s5], [s6]} = {{s5}, {s6}} and
J¬pK = {s5, s6}. On the other hand, Kh¬q is not true on s1:
although the agent can guarantee ¬q de facto on s1 by taking
a strategy such that {s1, s2} 7→ test and {s3} 7→ pills,
he cannot know it beforehand since nothing works at s2 to
make sure ¬q. Readers may also verify that Kh(p ↔ q)
holds at s1 and s2 (hint: a strategy is a partial function).
3 Axiomatization
3.1 The proof system
System SKH
Axioms
TAUT all axioms of propositional logic
DISTK Kp ∧ K(p→ q)→ Kq
T Kp→ p
4 Kp→ KKp
5 ¬Kp→ K¬Kp
AxKtoKh Kp→ Khp
AxKhtoKhK Khp→ KhKp
AxKhtoKKh Khp→ KKhp
AxKhKh KhKhp→ Khp
AxKhbot Kh⊥ → ⊥
Rules:
MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
NECK
ϕ
Kϕ
MONOKh
ϕ→ ψ
Khϕ→ Khψ
SUB
ϕ(p)
ϕ[ψ/p]
Note that we have S5 axioms for K. AxKtoKh says if p is
known then you know how to achieve p by doing nothing (we
allow the empty strategy). AxKhtoKhK reflects the first con-
dition in the semantics that the goal is known after the execu-
tions. We will come back to this axiom at the end of the paper.
Note that the termination condition is not fully expressible in
our language but AxKhbot captures part of it by ruling out
strategies that have no terminating executions at all. AxKhKh
essentially says that the strategies can be composed. Its va-
lidity is quite involved, to which we devote the next subsec-
tion. Finally, AxKhtoKKh is the positive introspection axiom
for Kh, whose validity is due to uniformity of the strategies
on indistinguishable states. The corresponding negative in-
trospection can be derived by using AxKhtoKKh, 5 and T:
Proposition 3.1. ⊢ ¬Khp→ K¬Khp.
Proof.
(1) ¬KKhp→ ¬Khp AxKhtoKKh
(2) K¬KKhp→ K¬Khp (1), NECK
(3) ¬KKhp→ K¬KKhp 5
(4) ¬KKhp→ K¬Khp (2), (3), MP
(5) ¬Khp→ ¬KKhp T
(6) ¬Khp→ K¬Khp (4), (5), MP
Note that we do not have the K axiom for Kh. Instead,
we have the monotonicity rule MONOKh. In fact, the logic is
not normal, as desired, e.g., Khp ∧ Khq → Kh(p ∧ q) is not
valid: the existence of two different strategies for different
goals does not imply the existence of a unified strategy to
realize both goals.
3.2 Validity of AxKhKh
AxKhKh is about the “sequential” compositionality of strate-
gies. Suppose on some pointed model there is a strategy σ
to guarantee that we end up with the states where on each
s of them we have some other strategy σs to make sure p
(KhKhp). Since the strategies are uniform, we only need to
consider some σ[s] for each [s]. Now to validate AxKhKh, we
need to design a unified strategy to compose σ and those σ[s]
into one strategy to still guarantee p (Khp). The general idea
is actually simple: first ordering those leafnodes [s] (using
Axiom of Choice); then by transfinite induction adjust σ[s]
one by one to make sure these strategies can fit together as a
unified strategy θ; finally, merge the relevant part of σ with
θ into the desired strategy. We make this idea precise below.
First we need an observation:
Proposition 3.2. Given strategies τ and σ with τ ⊆ σ, if
[s] ∈ dom(τ) and dom(σ) ∩ CELeaf(τ, s) = ∅, then a se-
quence is σ’s complete execution from [s] if and only if it is
τ ’s complete execution from [s].
Proof. Left to Right: Let [s0] · · · [sn] · · · be a σ’s complete
execution from [s]. We will show it is also a τ ’s com-
plete execution from [s]. Firstly, we show it is a possi-
ble execution give τ from [s]. If it is not, there exists [si]
such that [si] is not the leaf-node of this execution and
that [si] 6∈ dom(τ). Let [sj ] be the minimal equivalence
class in the sequence with such properties. It follows that
[sj ] ∈ CELeaf(τ, s) and [sj ] ∈ dom(σ). These are contradic-
tory with dom(σ) ∩ CELeaf(τ, s) = ∅.
Next we will show that [s0] · · · [sn] · · · be a τ ’s complete
execution from [s]. It is obvious if the sequence is infinite. If
it is finite, let the leaf-node is [sm]. It follows that [sm] 6∈
dom(σ). Since τ ⊆ σ, it follows [sm] 6∈ dom(τ). Therefore,
the execution is complete given τ .
Right to Left: Let [s0] · · · [sn] · · · be a τ ’s complete execu-
tion from [s], we will show it is also a σ’s complete execution
from [s]. Since τ ⊆ σ, it is also a possible execution given σ.
If the execution is infinite, it is obvious. If it is finite, let the
leaf-node is [sm]. It follows that [sm] ∈ CELeaf(τ, s). Since
dom(σ) ∩ CELeaf(τ, s) = ∅, it follows that [sm] 6∈ dom(σ).
Therefore, the execution is also complete give σ.
Proposition 3.3.  KhKhφ→ Khφ.
Proof. Supposing M, s  KhKhφ, we will show that
M, s  Khφ. It follows by the semantics that there exists
a strategy σ such that all σ’s complete executions from [s]
are finite and [t] ⊆ JKhφK for all [t] ∈ CELeaf(σ, s) (∗). If
[s] 6∈ dom(σ), then CELeaf(σ, s) = {[s]}, and then it is trivial
thatM, s  Khφ. Next we focus on the case of [s] ∈ dom(σ).
According to well-ordering theorem (equivalent to Axiom
of Choice), we assume CELeaf(σ, s) = {Si | i < γ} where
γ is an ordinal number and γ ≥ 1. Let si be an element in
Si; then [si] = Si. Since M, si  Khφ for each i < γ, it
follows that for each [si] there exists a strategy σi such that
all σi’s complete executions from [si] are finite and [v] ⊆ JφK
for all [v] ∈ CELeaf(σi, si) (◭). Next, in order to show
M, s  Khφ, we need to define a strategy τ . The definition
consists of the following steps.
Step I. By induction on i, we will define a set of strate-
gies τi where 0 ≤ i < γ. Let fi =
⋃
β<i τβ and Di =
CEInner(σi, si) \ (dom(fi) ∪ {[v] ∈ CELeaf(fi, t) | [t] ∈
dom(fi)}) we define:
• τ0 = σ0|CEInner(σ0,s0);
• τi = fi ∪ (σi|Di) for i > 0.
Claim 3.3.1. We have the following results:
1. For each 0 ≤ i < γ, τj ⊆ τi if j < i;
2. For each 0 ≤ i < γ, τi is a partial function;
3. For each 0 ≤ i < γ, dom(τi)∩CELeaf(τj , t) = ∅ where
t ∈ dom(τj) if j < i;
4. For each 0 ≤ i < γ, if δ = [t0] · · · is a τi’s complete
execution from [t] ∈ dom(τi) then |δ| = n for some n ∈
N and [tn] ⊆ JφK;
5. For each 0 ≤ i < γ, [si] ∈ dom(τi) or [si] ⊆ JφK.
Proof of claim 3.3.1:
1. It is obvious.
2. We prove it by induction on i. For the case of i = 0,
it is obvious. For the case of i = α > 0, it follows
by the IH that τβ is a partial function for each β < α.
Furthermore, it follows by 1. that τβ1 ⊆ τβ2 for all
β1 < β2 < α. Thus, we have fα =
⋃
β<α τβ is a par-
tial function. Since σα is a partial function, in order to
show τα is a partial function, we only need to show that
dom(fα) ∩ Dα = ∅. Since Dα = CEInner(σα, sα) \
dom(fα) \ {[v] ∈ CELeaf(fα, t) | t ∈ dom(fα)}, it is
obvious that dom(fα) ∩Dα = ∅.
3. We prove it by induction on i. It is obvious for the
case of i = 0. For the case of i = α > 0, given
j < α and t ∈ dom(τj), we need to show that dom(τα)∩
CELeaf(τj , t) = ∅. Supposing [v] ∈ CELeaf(τj , t), we
will show that [v] 6∈ dom(τα), namely [v] 6∈ dom(fα) ∪
Dα. Since j < α and fα =
⋃
β<α τα, it follows t ∈
dom(fα). Moreover, due to Dα = CEInner(σα, sα) \
dom(fα) \ {[v] ∈ CELeaf(fα, t) | t ∈ dom(fα)}, it fol-
lows [v] 6∈ Dα.
Next, we only need to show [v] 6∈ dom(fα). Assuming
[v] ∈ dom(fα), it follows that [v] ∈ dom(τβ) for some
β < α. There are two cases: j < β or j ≥ β. If j < β,
it follows by the IH that dom(τβ) ∩ CELeaf(τj , t) = ∅.
Contradiction. If j ≥ β, it follows by 1. that τβ ⊆ τj .
Due to [v] ∈ dom(τβ), it follows [v] ∈ dom(τj). It is
contradictory with [v] ∈ CELeaf(τj , t). Thus, we have
[v] 6∈ dom(fα).
4. We prove it by induction on i. For the case of i = 0, due
to dom(τ0) = CEInner(σ0, s0), it follows that there is a
σ0’s possible execution [s0] · · · [sm] such that m ∈ N
and [sm] = [t]. Let µ = [s0] · · · [sm−1] ◦ δ. (If
m = 0 then µ = δ). Since δ is a τ0’s complete ex-
ecution from [t], it follows that µ is a σ0’s complete
execution from [s0]. It follows by (◭) that µ is finite.
Thus, δ = [t0] · · · [tn] for some n ∈ N. Since [tn] ∈
CELeaf(σ0, s0), it follows by (◭) that [tn] ⊆ JφK.
For the case of i = α > 0, there are two situations:
[t] ∈ dom(fα) or [t] ∈ Dα. If [t] ∈ dom(fα), it follows
that [t] ∈ dom(τβ) for some β < α. By 3, we have
dom(τα)∩CELeaf(τβ , t) = ∅. Since δ is a τα’s complete
execution, it follows by Proposition 3.2 that δ is also a
τβ’s complete execution from [t]. It follows by the IH
that |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [tn] ⊆ JφK.
If [t] ∈ Dα, there are two cases: there exist k < |δ| and
β < α s.t. [tk] ∈ dom(τβ), or there do not exist such k
and β. (Please note that |δ| > 1 due to the fact that δ =
[t0] · · · is τα’s complete execution from [t] ∈ dom(τα)).
– [tk] ∈ dom(τβ) for some k < |δ| and some β <
α: It follows that µ = [tk] · · · is a τα’s complete
execution from [tk]. By 3. and Proposition 3.2, µ
is a τβ’s complete execution from [tk]. By IH, µ =
[tk] · · · [tk+n] for some n ∈ N and [tk+n] ⊆ JφK.
Therefore, |δ| = k + n.
– If there do not exist k < |δ| and β < α s.t.
[tk] ∈ dom(τβ), it follows that δ = [t0] · · · is a
σα’s possible execution from [t]. Since [t] ∈ Dα ⊆
CEInner(σα, sα), then there is a σα’s possible ex-
ecution [s0] · · · [sm] s.t. m ∈ N, [s0] = [sα] and
[sm] = [t]. Let µ = [s0] · · · [sm−1] ◦ δ. (If m = 0
then µ = δ). It follows that µ is σα’s possible ex-
ecution from sα. By (◭), all σα’s complete execu-
tions from sα are finite. Thus, µ is finite. There-
fore, δ = [t0] · · · [tn] for some n ∈ N.
We continue to show that [tn] ⊆ JφK. Since δ =
[t0] · · · [tn] is a τα’s complete execution from t and
it is also a σα’s possible execution from t, there are
two cases: [tn] ∈ CELeaf(fα, t′) for some t′ ∈
dom(fα), or δ is a σα’s complete execution from t.
If [tn] ∈ CELeaf(fα, t′) for some t′ ∈ dom(fα),
then there exists β < α s.t. [t] ∈ CELeaf(τβ , t′)
and [t′] ∈ dom(β). By IH, [tn] ⊆ JφK. If δ is a
σα’s complete execution from t, it follows that µ is
a σα’s complete execution from [sα]. Then by (◭),
we have [tn] ⊆ JφK.
5. If [si] 6∈ dom(σi), it follows by (◭) that [si] ⊆ JφK.
Otherwise, there are two cases: i = 0 or i = α > 0.
If i = 0, it follows by [s0] ∈ dom(σ0) that [s0] ∈
CEInner(σ0, s0). Thus, [s0] ∈ dom(τ0).
If i = α > 0 and [sα] ∈ dom(σα), we will show that
if [sα] 6∈ dom(τα) then [sα] ⊆ JφK. Firstly, we have
that [si] ∈ CEInner(σα, sα). Since [sα] 6∈ dom(τα),
it follows that [sα] ∈ CELeaf(fα, t) for some [t] ∈
dom(fα). It follows that there exists β < α such that
[sα] ∈ CELeaf(τβ , t) and t ∈ dom(τβ). It follows by 4.
that [si] ⊆ JφK.

Step II. We define τγ =
⋃
i<γ τi. It follows by 1. and 2.
of Claim 3.3.1 that τγ is indeed a partial function. Then we
prove the following claim.
Claim 3.3.2. If δ = [t0] · · · is a τγ’s complete execution from
[t] ∈ dom(τγ) then |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [tn] ⊆ JφK
Proof of claim 3.3.2: Since [t] ∈ dom(τγ), it follows that
[t] ∈ dom(τi) for some i < γ. It follows by 5. of Claim 3.3.1
that all τi’s complete executions from [t] are finite. Thus,
there exists µ ⊑ δ such that |µ| = n for some n ∈ N and µ
is τi’s complete execution from [t]. It follows by 5. of Claim
3.3.1 that [tn] ⊆ JφK.
Next, we only need to show δ = µ. If not, then δ =
[t0] · · · [tn][tn+1] · · · . We then have that there exists j < γ
such that {tk | 0 ≤ k ≤ n} ⊆ dom(τj). It cannot be that
j ≤ i. Otherwise, µ is not τi’s complete execution since
τj ⊆ τi by 1. of Claim 3.3.1. Thus, we have j > i. Since
we also have that [tn] ∈ dom(τj), [tn] ∈ CELeaf(τi, t) and
t ∈ dom(τi), this is contradictory with 3. of Claim 3.3.1.
Therefore, we have δ = µ. 
Step III. We define τ as τ = τγ ∪ (σ|C) where C =
CEInner(σ, s) \ (dom(τγ) ∪ {[v] ∈ CELeaf(τ ′, t) | [t] ∈
dom(τγ)}) and σ is the strategy mentioned at (∗). Since both
τγ and σ|C are partial functions, τ is also a partial function.
We then prove the following claim.
Claim 3.3.3. If δ = [t0] · · · is a τ ’s complete execution from
[t] ∈ dom(τ) then |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [tn] ⊆ JφK.
Proof of claim 3.3.3: Since dom(τ) = dom(τγ)∪C, there are
two cases: [t] ∈ dom(τγ) or [t] ∈ C.
If [t] ∈ dom(τγ), it follows that CELeaf(τγ , t) ∩ C = ∅.
Moreover, we have CELeaf(τγ , t) ∩ dom(τγ) = ∅. Thus, we
have CELeaf(τγ , t) ∩ dom(τ) = ∅. It follows by Proposition
3.2 that δ is a τγ’s complete execution from from [t]. It fol-
lows by Claim 3.3.2 |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [tn] ⊆ JφK
If [t] ∈ C, there are two cases: there exists k < |δ| such
that [tk] ∈ dom(τγ), or there does not exists such k. (Please
note that |δ| > 1 due to the fact that δ = [t0] · · · is τ ’s com-
plete execution from [t] ∈ dom(τ)).
• [tk] ∈ dom(τγ) for some k < |δ|: It follows that
µ = [tk] · · · is a τ ’s complete execution from [tk]. Since
dom(τ) ∩ CELeaf(τγ , tk) = ∅. It follows by Proposi-
tion 3.2 that µ is a τγ’s complete execution from [tk]. It
follows by Claim 3.3.2 that µ = [tk] · · · [tk+n] for some
n ∈ N and [tk+n] ⊆ JφK. Therefore, |δ| = k + n.
• If there does not exist k < |δ| s.t. [tk] ∈ dom(τγ), then
δ = [t0] · · · is a σ’s possible execution from [t]. Since
[t] ∈ C ⊆ CEInner(σ, s), then there is a σ’s possible
execution [s0] · · · [sm] s.t. m ∈ N, [s0] = [s] and [sm] =
[t]. Let µ = [s0] · · · [sm−1]◦δ. (Ifm = 0 then µ = δ). It
follows that µ is σ’s possible execution from s. By (∗),
all σ’s complete executions from s are finite. Thus, µ is
finite. Therefore, δ = [t0] · · · [tn] for some n ∈ N.
We continue to show that [tn] ⊆ JφK. Since δ =
[t0] · · · [tn] is a τ ’s complete execution from t and it is
also a σ’s possible execution from t, there are two cases:
[tn] ∈ CELeaf(τγ , t′) for some t′ ∈ dom(τγ), or δ is a
σ’s complete execution from t. If [tn] ∈ CELeaf(τγ , t′)
for some [t′] ∈ dom(τγ), it follows by Claim 3.3.2 that
[tn] ⊆ JφK. If δ is a σ’s complete execution from
t, it follows that µ is a σ’s complete execution from
[s]. It follows that [tn] = Si for some 0 ≤ i < γ.
Since δ = [t0] · · · [tn] is τ ’s complete execution from
[t] ∈ dom(τγ), it follows [tn] 6∈ dom(τγ). We then have
[tn] 6∈ dom(τi), namely Si 6∈ τi. It follows by 5. of
Claim 3.3.1 that Si ⊆ JφK, namely [tn] ⊆ JφK.

Next, we continue to show thatM, s  Khφ with the as-
sumption that [s] ∈ dom(σ). Since [s] ∈ dom(σ), we have
[s] ∈ CEInner(σ, s). There are two cases: [s] ∈ dom(τ)
or not. If [s] ∈ dom(τ), it follows by claim 3.3.3 that
M, s  Khφ. If [s] 6∈ dom(τ), due to [s] ∈ CEInner(σ, s), it
follows that [s] ∈ CELeaf(τγ , t) for some [t] ∈ dom(τγ).
It follows by Claim 3.3.2 that [s] ⊆ JφK. It follows that
M, s  Kφ. It is obvious thatM, s  Khφ.
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness). If ⊢ φ then  φ.
4 Completeness and Decidability
Let Φ be a subformula-closed set of formulas. It is obvious
that Φ is countable since the whole language itself is count-
able. Given a set of formulas∆, let: ∆|K = {Kφ | Kφ ∈ ∆},
∆|¬K = {¬Kφ | ¬Kφ ∈ ∆}, ∆|Kh = {Khφ | Khφ ∈ ∆},
∆|¬Kh = {¬Khφ | ¬Khφ ∈ ∆}. Below we define the
closure of Φ, and use it to build a canonical model w.r.t. Φ.
We will show that when Φ is finite then we can build a finite
model.
Definition 4.1. cl(Φ) is defined as:
cl(Φ) = Φ ∪ {Kφ | φ ∈ Φ}.
Definition 4.2 (Atom). Let cl(Φ) = {ψi | i ∈ N}. The
formula set ∆ = {Yi | i ∈ N} is an atom of cl(Φ) if
• Yi = ψi or Yi = ¬ψi for all ψi ∈ cl(Φ);
• ∆ is consistent.
Note that if Φ is the whole language then an atom is simply
a maximal consistent set. By a standard inductive construc-
tion, we can obtain the Lindenbaum-like result in our setting
(which is useful to show the existence lemma for K):
Proposition 4.3. Let ∆ be an atom of cl(Φ), Γ ⊆ ∆ and
φ ∈ cl(Φ). If Γ ∪ {±φ} is consistent then there is an atom
∆′ of cl(Φ) such that (Γ ∪ {±φ}) ⊆ ∆′, where ±φ = φ or
±φ = ¬φ.
Proof. Let Γ = {φk | k ∈ N}. Since ∆ is an atom and
Γ ⊆ ∆, it follows that there is a set Γ′ = {χk ∈ cl(Φ) |
k ∈ N} such that φk = χk or φk = ¬χk for all k ∈ N. Let
ψ1, · · · , ψn, · · · be all the formulas in cl(Φ) \ Γ′ \ {φ}. We
define Γi as below.
Γ0 = Γ ∪ {±φ}
Γi+1 =
{
Γi ∪ {ψi} if Γi ∪ {ψi} is consistent
Γi ∪ {¬ψi} else
Firstly, we will show Γi is consistent for all i ∈ N. Since
Γ0 is consistent, we only need to show that if Γi is consistent
then Γi+1 is consistent, i.e. either Γi ∪ {ψi} or Γi ∪ {¬ψi} is
consistent. Assuming both Γi ∪ {ψi} and Γi ∪ {¬ψi} are not
consistent, it follows that Γi ⊢ ¬ψi and Γi ⊢ ψi. That is, Γi
is inconsistent. Contradiction. Therefore, either Γi ∪ {ψi} or
Γi ∪ {¬ψi} is consistent.
Let ∆′ =
⋃
i∈N Γi. It follows that ∆
′ is consistent. It is
obvious that either ψ ∈ ∆′ or ¬ψ ∈ ∆′ for all ψ ∈ cl(Φ).
Therefore,∆′ is an atom of cl(Φ).
Definition 4.4. Given a subformula-closed Φ, the canonical
modelMΦ = 〈W,ACT,∼, {
x
−→| x ∈ ACT}, V 〉 is defined as:
• W = {∆ | ∆ is an atom of cl(Φ)};
• ACT = {φ | Khφ ∈ Φ};
• ∆ ∼ ∆′ iff ∆|K = ∆′|K;
• for each φ ∈ ACT, ∆
φ
−→ ∆′ iff Khφ,¬Kφ ∈ ∆ and
Kφ ∈ ∆′;
• for each p ∈ Φ, p ∈ V (∆) iff p ∈ ∆.
Note that we use formulas that the agent knows how to
achieve as the action labels, and we introduce an action transi-
tion if it is necessary, i.e.,Khφ but ¬Kφ (empty strategy does
not work). Requiring Kφ ∈ ∆′ is to reflect the first condition
in the semantics of Kh. Using NECK, DISTK and Proposition
4.3, it is routine to show the existence lemma for K:
Proposition 4.5. Let ∆ be a state inMΦ, and Kφ ∈ cl(Φ).
If Kφ 6∈ ∆ then there exists∆′ ∈ [∆] such that ¬φ ∈ ∆′.
Proof. Let Γ = ∆|K ∪∆|¬K ∪ {¬φ}. Γ is consistent. If not,
there are Kφi, · · · ,Kφn and ¬Kψ1, · · · ,¬Kψm in ∆ such
that
⊢ Kφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kφn ∧ ¬Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Kψm → φ.
Following by NECK and DISTK, we have
⊢ K(Kφi ∧ · · · ∧ Kφn ∧ ¬Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Kψm)→ Kφ.
Since the epistemic operator K is distributive over ∧ and ⊢
KKφi ↔ Kφi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ⊢ K¬Kψi ↔ ¬Kψi for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
⊢ Kφi ∧ · · · ∧ Kφn ∧ ¬Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Kψm → Kφ.
SinceKφi, · · · ,Kφn and¬Kψ1, · · · ,¬Kψm are all in∆ and
Kφ ∈ cl(Φ), it follows that Kφ ∈ ∆. It is contradictory with
the assumption that Kφ 6∈ ∆. Therefore, Γ is consistent. It
follows by Proposition 4.3 that there exists an atom ∆′ of
cl(Φ) such that Γ ⊆ ∆′. Since (∆|K ∪∆|¬K) ⊆ ∆′, we have
∆′ ∼ ∆, that is, ∆′ ∈ [∆].
Proposition 4.6. Let ∆ and ∆′ be two states in MΦ such
that∆ ∼ ∆′. We have∆|Kh = ∆′|Kh.
Proof. For each Khφ ∈ ∆, by Definition 4.1, Khφ ∈ Φ.
Then KKhφ ∈ cl(Φ). For each Khφ ∈ ∆, by Axiom
AxKhtoKKh, we have KKhφ ∈ ∆. Since ∆ ∼ ∆′, then
KKhφ ∈ ∆′, and by Axiom T, Khφ ∈ ∆′. Then we showed
that Khφ ∈ ∆ implies Khφ ∈ ∆′. Similarly we can prove
Khφ ∈ ∆′ implies Khφ ∈ ∆. Hence,∆|Kh = ∆′|Kh.
The following is a crucial observation for the latter proofs.
Proposition 4.7. Let ∆ be a state in MΦ and ψ ∈ ACT be
executable at [∆]. If Khφ ∈ ∆′ for all ∆′ with [∆]
ψ
−→ [∆′]
then Khφ ∈ ∆.
Proof. First, we show that Kψ is not consistent with ¬Khφ.
It is obvious that Khφ ∈ cl(Φ). Since ψ is executable at [∆],
there are atoms Γ1 and Γ2 s.t. Γ1
ψ
−→ Γ2. Then Kψ ∈ Γ2.
Assuming that Kψ is consistent with ¬Khφ, by Proposition
4.3 there exists an atom Γ of cl(Φ) s.t. {Kψ,¬Khφ} ⊆ Γ.
Since ψ ∈ ACT is executable at [∆], then by definition of
ψ
−→,∼ and Proposition 4.6, Khψ,¬Kψ ∈ ∆. It follows that
∆
ψ
−→ Γ, then [∆]
ψ
−→ [Γ]. This is contradictory with the
assumption thatKhφ ∈ ∆′ for all∆′ with [∆]
ψ
−→ [∆′]. Then
Kψ is not consistent with ¬Khφ. Hence, ⊢ Kψ → Khφ.
Since ⊢ Kψ → Khφ, it follows by Rule MONOKh and Ax-
iom AxKhtoKhK that ⊢ Khψ → KhKhφ. Moreover, it fol-
lows by Axiom AxKhKh that ⊢ Khψ → Khφ. Since ψ is ex-
ecutable at [∆], it follows by the definition of
ψ
−→ and Propo-
sition 4.6 that Khψ ∈ ∆. Therefore, we have Khφ ∈ ∆.
Lemma 4.8. For each φ ∈ cl(Φ),MΦ,∆  φ iff φ ∈ ∆.
Proof. We prove it by induction on φ. We only focus on the
case of Khφ; the other cases are straightforward, e.g., Kφ
case can proved based on Proposition 4.5. Note that ifKhφ ∈
cl(Φ) then φ ∈ cl(Φ) thus by Definition 4.1 Kφ ∈ cl(Φ).
Right to Left: If Khφ ∈ ∆, we will showMΦ,∆  Khφ.
Firstly, there are two cases: Kφ ∈ ∆ orKφ 6∈ ∆. If Kφ ∈ ∆,
then Kφ, φ ∈ ∆′ for all ∆′ ∈ [∆]. Since φ ∈ Φ, it fol-
lows by IH that MΦ,∆′  φ for all ∆′ ∈ [∆]. Therefore,
MΦ,∆  Kφ. It follows by Axiom AxKtoKh and the sound-
ness of SKH thatMΦ,∆  Khφ. If¬Kφ ∈ ∆, we first show
that Kφ is consistent. If not, namely ⊢ Kφ → ⊥, it follows
by Rule MONOKh that ⊢ KhKφ→ Kh⊥. It follows by Axiom
AxKhbot that ⊢ KhKφ→ ⊥. Since Khφ ∈ ∆, it follows by
Axiom AxKhtoKhK that ∆ ⊢ ⊥, which is contradictory with
the fact that∆ is consistent. Therefore,Kφ is consistent.
By Proposition 4.3 there exists an atom ∆′ s.t. Kφ ∈ ∆′.
Note that φ ∈ ACT. Thus, we have ∆
φ
−→ ∆′, then [∆]
φ
−→
[∆′]. Let [∆′′] be an equivalence class s.t. [∆]
φ
−→ [∆′′],
which indicates Γ
φ
−→ Γ′′ for some Γ ∈ [∆] and Γ′′ ∈ [∆′′].
By definition of
φ
−→ and ∼ we get Kφ ∈ Θ for all Θ ∈ [∆′′].
By IH, MΦ,Θ  φ for all Θ ∈ [∆′′], namely [∆′′] ⊆ JφK.
Moreover,
φ
−→ is not a loop on [∆] because ¬Kφ ∈ ∆. Thus,
the partial function σ = {[∆] 7→ φ} is a strategy s.t. all its
complete executions starting from [∆] are finite and [∆′′] ⊆
JφK for each [∆′′] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆). Then,MΦ,∆  Khφ.
Left to Right: Suppose MΦ,∆  Khφ, we will show
Khφ ∈ ∆. By the semantics, there exists a strategy σ s.t.
all σ’s complete executions starting from [∆] are finite and
[Γ] ⊆ JφK for all [Γ] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆). By IH, φ ∈ Γ′ for all
Γ′ ∈ [Γ] and [Γ] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆). By Proposition 4.5, we
getKφ ∈ Γ for all [Γ] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆). By Axiom AxKtoKh
and Proposition 4.6, Khφ ∈ Γ for all [Γ] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆).
If [∆] 6∈ dom(σ), it is obvious that Khφ ∈ ∆ because
[∆] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆). Next, we consider the case of [∆] ∈
dom(σ), then [∆] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆). In order to showKhφ ∈
∆, we will show a more strong result that Khφ ∈ ∆′ for all
[∆′] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆). Firstly, we show the following claim:
Claim 4.8.1. If there exists [∆′] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆) such that
¬Khφ ∈ ∆′ then there exists an infinite execution of σ start-
ing from [∆].
Proof of claim 4.8.1: Let X be the set {[Θ] ∈
CEInner(σ,∆) | ¬Khφ ∈ Θ}. It follows that [∆′] ∈ X
and X ⊆ dom(σ). We define a binary relation R on X as
R = {([Θ], [Θ′]) | [Θ]
σ([Θ])
−−−−→ [Θ′]}.
For each [Θ] ∈ X , we have that σ([Θ]) is executable at [Θ].
Since ¬Khφ ∈ Θ, by Proposition 4.7 there exists an atom Θ′
s.t. [Θ]
σ([Θ])
−−−−→ [Θ′] and ¬Khφ ∈ Θ′. Since Khφ ∈ Γ
for all [Γ] ∈ CELeaf(σ,∆) and [Θ] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆),we
have [Θ′] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆). Then [Θ′] ∈ X . Therefore,
R is an entire binary relation on X , namely for each [Θ] ∈
X there is [Θ′] ∈ X such that ([Θ], [Θ′]) ∈ R. Then by
Axiom of Dependent Choice there exists an infinite sequence
[Θ0][Θ1] · · · s.t. ([Θn], [Θn+1]) ∈ R for all n ∈ N.
From the definition of R, [Θ0][Θ1] · · · is a complete exe-
cution of σ starting from [Θ0]. Since [Θ0] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆)
and all complete execution of σ from [∆] are finite, there is a
possible execution [∆0] · · · [∆j ] for some j ∈ N s.t. [∆0] =
[∆] and [∆j ] = [Θ0]. Therefore, [∆0] · · · [∆j ][Θ1] · · · is an
infinite complete execution of σ from [∆]. 
Therefore, we have Khφ ∈ ∆′ for all [∆′] ∈
CEInner(σ, s). Otherwise, by claim 4.8.1 there is an infi-
nite complete execution given σ from [∆]. This is contra-
dictory with all σ’s complete execution from [∆] are finite,
then Khφ ∈ ∆′ for all [∆′] ∈ CEInner(σ, s). Since [∆] ∈
dom(σ), we get [∆] ∈ CEInner(σ,∆). Then Khφ ∈ ∆.
Now let Φ be the set of all formulas, then each maximal
consistent set∆ is actually an atom which satisfies all its for-
mulas in MΦ, according to the above truth lemma. Com-
pleteness then follows immediately.
Theorem 4.9. SKH is strongly complete.
Note that if Φ is the set of all subformulas of a given for-
mula φ, then cl(Φ) is still finite. Due to the soundness of
SKH and Proposition 4.3, a satisfiable formula φ must be
consistent thus appearing in some atom, and thus φ is satis-
fiable inMΦ. It is not hard to see that |MΦ| ≤ 22|φ| where
2|φ| is the bound on the size of cl(Φ). This gives us a small
model property of our logic, then decidability follows.
Theorem 4.10. SKH is decidable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose an epistemic logic of both (goal-
directed) knowing how and knowing that, and capture the in-
teraction of the two. We also present an proof system SKH
for this logic. We have shown that SKH is sound and com-
plete w.r.t. the semantics, and that SKH is decidable. We hope
the axioms are illuminating towards a better understanding of
knowing how.
Note that we do not impose any special properties between
the interaction of
a
−→ and∼ in the models so far. In the future,
it would be interesting to see whether assuming properties of
perfect recall and/or no learning (cf. e.g., [Fagin et al., 1995;
Wang and Li, 2012]) can change the logic or not.
Our notion of knowing how is relatively strong, particu-
larly evidenced by the axiom AxKhtoKhK : Khφ → KhKφ,
which is due to the first condition of our semantics for Kh,
inspired by planning with uncertainty. We believe it is rea-
sonable for the scenarios where the agent has perfect recall
(or, say, never forgets), which is usually assumed implicitly in
the discussions on planning (cf. [Yu et al., 2016]). However,
for a forgetful agent it may not be intuitive anymore, e.g., I
know how to get drunk when sober but I may not know how
to get to the state that I know I am drunk, assuming drunk
people do not know they are drunk. The axiom AxKhKh is
also interesting in distinguishing different types of knowing
how. We have been focusing on the goal-directed knowing
how [Gochet, 2013], but for other types of knowing how such
as knowing how to swim, the axiom may not be reasonable
anymore, e.g., I know how to let myself to know how to swim
(by registering an excellent swimming course) does not mean
that I know how to swim right now. We leave the discussion
of other types of knowing how in the future. Another obvious
next step is to consider knowing how in multi-agent settings.
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